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The aim of this study is to evaluate the efficiency of the small scale farmers for the production year 
2006/2007 in Limpopo province using policy analysis matrix. A total of twelve production systems 
were selected. Result shows that all were profitable under market condition with existing policies 
and all except Dry land maize had comparative advantage suggesting efficiency in the systems. 
Ranking the systems in term of PRC and DRC, irrigated vegetables like Potatoes, cabbages and 
tomatoes had higher profitability and comparative advantages than field crops like both dry and 
irrigated maize, Peanut and Beans. Despite competiveness in all and comparative advantage in 
most systems, these was not due to policy intervention as incentive indicators, e.g. SRP, shows that 
all production systems are being taxed indicating little motivation from policies for small scale 
farmers to production. 
1.  Introduction 
South Africa has undergone immense social and economic change over the last 10 years led by the 
abolition of apartheid. An underlying principle for virtually all government policies is to bring the 
previously excluded black community into the mainstream economy through job creation and 
entrepreneurship (OECD, 2006). As part of the South African agricultural policy, the government 
intends to increase the income of the poorest group in the society by making small-scale 
agriculture more efficient and internationally competitive, so as stimulate increase in number of 
small-scale and medium-scale farmers and conserve agricultural natural resources (IPTRID, 2000; 
NDA, 1998). 
 
South Africa is however, a water scarce country with very low rainfall at an average of about 
500mm per annum which is strongly seasonal and highly irregular in occurrence (Oosthuizen, 2005). Irrigation is an important factor in the production of permanent crops or in obtaining high 
yield from field crops, where water availability is an important limiting factor in agricultural 
production especially under South Africa situation (Oosthuizen, 2005). 
 
South Africa has about 1.3 million hectares under irrigation. However, with limited opportunity for 
large scale expansion due to limited water availability, smallholder irrigation is envisioned to play 
a vital role in South Africa in achieving household food security and improving the livelihood of 
the country’s rural population (IMWI, 2007). 
Since government finance is a limited resource with conflicting needs, its efficient allocation 
should be paramount to any policy objective. Therefore a comprehensive assessment of small-scale 
agriculture system is essential to see if the government’s intervention is worthwhile. 
 
 
1.1.  Objective of the Study 
The main objective of the study is to determine the efficiency of the small-scale irrigation sector of 
Limpopo Province. 
 
The specific objectives of the study are 
  To assess the  Profitability of the  small-scale farmers 
  To assess the comparative advantage of the Small Scale farmers 
  To determine policy divergence in the sector 
 
2.  Literature Review on Market and Efficiency  Agricultural policy is a critical element in determining the rate and pattern of economic growth 
(Monke and Pearson 1989). The importance of food as a basic need and in providing cheap food to 
keep wages low in the process of economic development has caused governments to intervene in 
food market in various ways (Najafi, 2005).  
 
Many governments intervene directly in agricultural product markets, with the objectives to 
redistribute income, generate public revenues, correct market failures and provide incentives to 
producers (Braverman, et al., 1983). These policies influencing the agricultural sector fall into one 
of three categories – agricultural price policies, macro-economic policies, or public investment 
policies.  
 
Economic theories hold that markets are fundamental to the operation of an economy, as 
movements in supply and demand send signals to economic actors through changes in prices, and 
these guide the actions of individuals (Dorward et al. 2004a). Where markets are ‘efficient’, supply 
and demand interact without impediment or distortion, and prices move quickly to reflect changes 
in the demand or supply of any good or service. From the theoretical perspective, when markets 
are efficient and fully coordinated, economies will be at their most efficient level and this will 
stimulate growth. Productive resources such as land, labour and capital will be allocated 
effectively between alternative and competing uses, specialisation will occur according to the 
principle of comparative advantage and the benefits of growth in one area of the economy will be 
effectively translated to other parts (Dorward et al. 2004b). 
 However, markets rarely, if ever, work in the perfect stylised manner described above. In many 
situations, markets are said to ‘fail’ (Dorward et al. 2004b). According to Pearson et al. (2003), a 
market fails if it does not generate competitive prices that reflect social opportunity costs and lead 
to an efficient allocation of products or factors. They gave three basic types of market failures that 
create divergences. The first is monopoly (seller controls over market prices) or monopsony (buyer 
controls over market prices). The second are negative externalities (costs for which the imposer 
cannot be charged) or positive externalities (benefits for which the provider cannot receive 
compensation). The third are factor market imperfections (inadequate development of institutions 
to provide competitive services and full information or asymmetric information). Such failures 
often motivate government intervention in markets, although interventions have often done more 
harm than good, either by distorting incentives or by creating public sector market power. The 
state therefore needs intervene to correct these market failures, as it was believed that the private 
sector was either too weak or too poorly motivated to act in the national interest (DFID, 2004). 
Government intervention plays a critical role in ‘kick starting’ markets by establishing coordinated 
exchange systems at a critical time (Dorward et al. 2004b).  
 
It has been demonstrated historically that almost all successful countries have built up their 
industries through some form of selective sheltering of domestic producers. Protection of infant 
industries enables domestic companies to get established and to acquire the scale, knowledge, and 
technology to compete with already established international competitors (Legrain, 2006). 
According to Dorward et al. (2004b), markets will fail in poor economies, if states do not 
coordinate them beyond a narrow range of public goods interventions. This implies that state 
involvement, of some sort, is a necessary condition for markets to work. For instant, Owuor, (1998) agues that poor households in Kenyan generally perceive market to be too risky for the 
purchase of their food needs. Therefore these households cannot rely on the market to obtain their 
food needs. He suggested policy intervention to reduce costs in the food system so that households 
may be able to shift into higher-valued crops and increase their agricultural income without putting 
their families in jeopardy of acquiring food. Also, public investments in rural sectors does not only 
contribute to growth, employment, and wages in rural areas as investments in infrastructure can 
raise returns to agricultural producers or lower agricultural costs of production, but also help the 
development of the national economy by providing labour, human and physical capital, cheaper 
food, and markets for urban industrial and service development (Fan et al., 2004, and Pearson et al. 
2003). 
 
According to Ahmad and Martini (2000), provision of the public goods, correction for imperfect 
markets like rural credit and externalities are efficiency corrections, while issues like income 
distribution and price stabilization are normative.  
 
Anderson et al., (2006) argued that despite the strong case in economic theory for governments in 
developing countries to implement sizeable public investment programmes to raise the rate of 
economic growth, empirical evidence on the links between public investment and economic 
growth is somewhat inconclusive and that although there is more evidence that public capital is 
productive, in the sense that it complements private capital and other factors of production, there is 
a clear need for caution with the choice of the optimal investment level and allocation across 
sectors. The case for a rise in public investment needs to be assessed on a country-by-country 
basis, according to the structure of its economy and its initial physical public capital stock.   
Tariffs also have a disproportionate effect on the poor. While farmers and landowners are better 
off in terms of access to local food and potentially higher incomes, they are still worse off because 
of higher prices and limited access to imported food in times of domestic shortfall. However, the 
effectiveness of border measures also depends on whether or not the higher prices actually reach 
poor farmers in rural areas (Tutwiler and Straub, 2005). 
 
In their assessment of the competitiveness of Indian cotton production Mohanty et al., (2002) 
concluded that trade liberalization and domestic policy reforms that alter the current levels of 
effective protection could significantly affect the collection of crops produced in different regions 
of the country  
 
However,  Arndt and Tyner (2000)  stated that there are  available evidences to indicate that 
decreases in protection rates for agricultural products tend strongly to increase the welfare of urban 
households and may or may not harm farm households.  
 
In terms of economic concept of a perfectly competitive market,  policies influencing the 
agricultural sector can be broadly partitioned into three categories: market distorting (Restrictions 
on investment, imports and exports, production and distribution, and price controls), market 
correcting (Examples are subsidies for the production/supply of infrastructure services, e.g. water, 
roads, highways, electricity, telecom connectivity) and market creating policies (an important 
subcategory of market correcting policies. An example of this would be a subsidy on issue of 
and/or holding of debt of higher tenure that leads to the creation of a long term debt market) Virmani (2004). However, a given policy may traverse the spectrum from market creating to 
market distorting over a period of time depending on the economic environment and the evolution 
of market institutions and the quality of governance. An example is a study carried in Malawi by 
Nakhumwal, et al. (1999), who found out that despite scrapping of most price-distorting policies, 
the Malawian agriculture is still haunted by distortions created by previous policies. Lack of 
serious and aggressive private sector participation suggests that it will take some time before the 
benefits of market liberalisation may be realised and appreciated. 
 
Kirsten, et al. (1998) stated that protection usually creates a wedge between market (private) prices 
of commodities and their economic (social) prices. They argued that whenever discrepancies exist 
between private and social prices, the interest of the farmers and that of the state diverge. On the 
one hand, a crop can be profitable to farmers (e.g. because of input or output subsidies), but its 
production may not represent efficient use of resources from the point of view of the nation. On 
the other hand, a crop can be unprofitable to farmers (e.g. due to taxes imposed on output or input 
prices), however its production may represent an efficient use of the nation's resources. Hence, by 
comparing private profitability with social profitability not only can the overall effect of 
government policies be measured, but the influence of individual policies can be quantified by 
disaggregating the overall discrepancy into its constituent parts Nakhumwal, et al. (1999) 
 
Distortions in the context of production and marketing of agricultural commodities can be defined 
as those interventions, which lead to price alterations that farmers face i.e. if prices are higher or 
lower and quantities produced, bought, and sold are also higher or lower than the levels that would 
usually exist in a competitive market, therefore affecting their incomes and welfare. Distortions create incentives or disincentives for production systems and the long-term environment for the 
development and sustainability of the markets, and of agricultural production, hence directly 
having impacts on poverty alleviation initiatives (Rweyemamu and Kimaro, 2006). 
 
Agricultural markets can be distorted or prevented from working efficiently in many ways. One 
obvious hindrance is that of national or regional borders, including tariff and nontariff barriers 
which discourage imports. Another, are subsidies or other aids which encourage exports. Another 
form of hindrance are domestic policies, including price supports, production-distorting income 
supports, production quotas or restraints, and input subsidies, all of which can distort production or 
marketing patterns. All such interferences with agricultural markets represent heavy costs for 
global commerce, national economic growth, farmers, consumers and the environment (IPC, 
1999). For instant, the fixing of commodity prices below market levels inevitably created a 
disincentive for agricultural producers. By the late 1970s, low producer prices had led to the 
stagnation of production and exports and to increased parallel market activity, including cross-
border smuggling, in many developing countries, especially in those areas of Africa and Central 
America (Barrett and Mutambatsere, 2005) 
 
Policy distortions is a problem faced in most of the developing countries and in some developed 
countries as is indicated by the major effort that has been undertaken in recent years to measure the 
distortions in the agriculture sector, by the several studies have sought to evaluate the costs of such 
trade distortions (Rweyemamu and Kimaro, 2006).  
 Goldin and Knudsen (1990) stated that many studies of agricultural protectionism have revealed a 
fairly consistent pattern of protection across countries and time, with such protection of 
agricultural producers severely distorting national and international resource use, as well as 
agricultural markets and trade, particularly in the developed countries. The late 1970s and early 
1980s saw several less developed countries raising producer prices for cereals relative to other 
competing opportunities, thus increasing incentives for food production (Rweyemamu and 
Kimaro, 2006). 
 
To evaluate the effect of policies on producers’ behaviour and incentives, various criteria are used; 
the protective criteria, measured by protective and effective nominal coefficients, measure the 
deviation of domestic from international prices. “Comparative criteria” measures government 
protection on the economic efficiency on the factors of production, measured by domestic resource 
cost ratio (DRC), social cost-benefit ratio (SCB) and social cost-benefit ratio without land (LSB). 
Najafi, 2005 
 
The ability of an agricultural system to compete without distorting government policies can be 
strengthened or eroded by changes in economic conditions. Comparative advantage is an indicator 
of economical efficient production of a commodity. Comparative advantage refers to 
competitiveness that occurs in three categories of economic parameters –world prices of tradable 
outputs and inputs; social opportunity costs of domestic factors of production (labour, capital and 
land); and production technologies used in farming or marketing. Collectively, these three 
parameters determine comparative advantage (Aji, 2003).  
 According to Virmani (2004), it is therefore necessary to be aware of the history of market 
distortions and their consequences, as these are an important input into the process of determining 
the timing and phasing of particular reforms. 
 
 
3.  Methodology 
3.1.  Study Area 
The study was carried out in Limpopo Province, one of South Africa’s nine provinces found in the 
northernmost part of the country. It covers an area of 12.46 million hectares accounting for 10.2 
per cent of the total area of South Africa. The provincial population of 5.56 million is divided into 
five districts of Capricorn, Mopani, Sekhukhune, Vhembe and Waterberg. The population is 
predominantly rural consisting of about 89 per cent of the total with the main occupation of the 
people being agriculture. It has a dual agricultural system consisting 5000 large-scale commercial 
farmers who occupied 70 percent of the prime land and 273000 small-scale farmers occupying the 
remaining 30 percent of the land. Most of these small-scale farmers are in the former homeland 
majority of who are women (PROVIDE, 2005; Nesamvuni et. al., 2003; LDA, 2006). Limpopo is 
one of the richest agricultural regions of the country noted for its production of fruits and 
vegetables, cereals, tea and sugar with agriculture playing a major role in its economic growth and 
development (M’Marete, 2003).  
 
Bembridge (2002) identifies 167 existing irrigation schemes in the Province with small-scale 
farmers found operating on 117 of these. The small-scale irrigation schemes have about 10,150 
farmers with an average individual land holding of about 1.5 hectare per farmer.   
3.2.  Data Collection 
400 farmers were randomly selected from 15 active irrigation schemes and 10 non-active irrigation 
schemes or dry-land schemes found in the province. A semi structured questionnaire was issued 
for production information of 2006. Information was further gathered from extension officers. 
Price information was obtained form local shops and also from the internet. This information was 
used for the estimation of farm budgets that represent the costs and returns to production activities.  
 
3.3.  Data Analysis 
Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) was used to assess the efficiency of small-scale agriculture in 
Limpopo Province. PAM measures the competitiveness and the comparative advantage of existing 
systems and also the impact of policy on these systems 
 
PAM is a computational framework, developed by Monke and Pearson (1989) for measuring input 
use efficiency in production, comparative advantage, and the degree of government interventions. 
 
The primary strength of the PAM is that it allows desegregations of the production activities, 
assessment of the effects of policy induced transfers, and individual and net effects of seemingly 
conflicting sets of policies, therefore making it usage very straightforward (Nelson and 
Panggabean, 1991).  
 PAM suffers a weakness of the assumption of fixed input-output coefficients. Nevertheless, it can 
readily accommodate such parameter changes using sensitivity analysis (simulation). Also PAM 
can not be constructed for a crop without an international price. 
 
The basic format of the PAM as shown in Table 1 is a two-way accounting identities. The PAM 
table consists of private and social profitability in its first and second rows and divergences in its 
third row. The private profits evaluated at market prices and social profits evaluated at social or 
efficiency prices. If there are no market distortions, the two are often the same. If, however, there 
are market failures or distortions then the two would diverge from one another. Their divergence 









Cost  Profit 
   Tradable Non  Tradable 
Private Price  A  B  C  D 
Social Price  E  F  G  H 
Divergence I  J  K  L 
             
  
The symbols (capital letters) are defined as follows: 
A  Revenues in private prices (market prevailing prices, also called accounting prices). B  Costs of tradable inputs (such as fertilisers, seeds, plastic mulch, etc.) in private prices. 
C  Costs of domestic factors (such as labour, capital, etc.) in private prices. 
D  Private Profits (D=A-B-C). 
E  Revenues in social prices (economic efficiency prices or shadow prices). 
F  Costs of tradable inputs (such as fertilisers, seeds, plastic mulch, etc.) in social prices. 
G  Costs of domestic factors such as (labour, capital, etc.) in social prices. 
H  Social profits (H = E-F-G). 
I  Output Transfers (I = A-E) 
J  Input Transfers (J=B-F) 
K  Factor Transfers (K=C-G) 
L  Net Transfers (L=D-H or L=I-J-K) 
 
3.4.  Data Modelling 
Twelve production systems (Dry land Maize and Sorghum, and drip irrigation systems for maize, 
tomatoes, Onion, Peanut, Potatoes, Beans, Green beans Chillies and Sweet potatoes) were selected. 
Production factors were broken down into tradable outputs and inputs, factor or domestic inputs 
for the construction of the PAM model was constructed.  
 
Tradable Inputs and Outputs 
For all inputs and outputs except pesticides, fuel and electricity, c.i.f. prices obtained from the 
department of trade and industry were used as social prices while the actual market prices were 
regarded as private prices. For pesticide and fuel, the social price was determined by tax on 






Minimum labour wage for rural farm workers was used as private labour cost while the 
competitive price paid by the local farmers to labour was used for social price. 
 
Tractor, Pumps and drip pipes 
The Social costs of tractor pump and drip pipes were derived from deduction taxes from the 
private costs and were then discounted (cost of recovery). Their contribution per hectare 
productivity was determined and used as social prices. 
 
Land, Water, and Management skill 
 The value of agricultural land, for example is determined by the land's worth in growing alternate 
crops. However, due to lack specialization these valuation will be difficult to determine, therefore 
crop profits interpret the will be as rent to land and other fixed factors (e.g. management and 
ability to bear risk) per hectare of land used. Small scale irrigation farmer are not charged for water 
use, resulting to no private value for their usage. Therefore like land and management, profit will 
be interpreted as return to these factors. 
 
 4.  Results 
All crops had positive private and social profits except Dry land Maize, with negative social 
profitability (See Table 2).  Positives private profitability for all crops indicates that, they are 
profitable under present policies. This profit indicates return to factor of production (Land, 
management and water) Therefore, there exits opportunities for their expansion. Positive social 
profit implies that even without distorting policies in place, all crops except Sorghum is profitable. 
Indicating that with the exception of sorghum, it may be more profitable to produce the crops than 
to import. In terms of Net transfer, Dry land maize and Dry land Sorghum had positive values 
which indicate that resources are transferred from other sector of the economy in to them. As 
concern the other production systems, the net policy effects showed that there were transfers of 
income from the farmers to the state. 
 
Table 2: Private prices, social prices and net divergence for all crops 
Crops 
Private 
Profit Social  Profit
Net 
Divergence 
Tomatoes 54435.20  150198.75  -95763.55 
Dry Maize  1026.20  -278.15  1304.35 
Irrigated Maize  2949.70  7427.69  -4477.99 
Sorghum 3469.20  2523.25  945.95 
Onion 36274.20  100671.22  -64397.02 
Cabbage 58771.70  100215.04  -41443.34 
Peanut 3038.20  9705.50  -6667.30 Beans 539.95  6588.15  -6048.20 
Green Beans  16988.70  64992.39  -48003.69 
Potatoes 49456.60  175144.92  -125688.32 
Chillies 13834.00  38983.93  -25149.93 











According to the calculated incentive indicators of SRP, EPC, NPCI and NPCO, government 
policies offered little or no protection to producers for majority of the systems. For instance all 
production systems apart of dry land maize were implicitly taxed. This is as indicated by the 
negative SRPs. Dry land maize alone was implicitly subsidized. Also looking the combine 
incentive of inputs and outputs as measured by the EPC, only for dry land maize, irrigated maize 
and dry land sorghum do policies intervention in form of protection provided incentives to 
produce; the rest of the systems were not protected. The most protected was the dry land maize 
(EPC= 1.3398) while the least motivated is sweet potatoes (EPC= 0.2092). The result on Table 3, NPCO > 1 of both dry land maize and irrigated maize showing that there was incentive for their 
production (i.e. what they get for their production is more than as reflected by the world price). On 
the other hand, NPCI > 1 for all production systems showed disincentive in their production. It 
showed that they pay more for their inputs as compared with the world price.  
  
Due to the fact that the values of PCR for all production systems were less than 1, it is an 
indication that the entire production systems were profitable under existing market prices. 
However as shown by Table 4, Cabbage (0.0741), tomatoes (0.0931) and potatoes (0.1109) were 
the most profitable crop to produce respectively, while Beans (0.8956), Irrigated maize (0.7018) 
and Peanut (0.6310) were the least profitable respectively.  
Table 3: Incentive and comparative advantage Indicators 
Crops PCR  DRC  NPCO  NPCI  EPC  SRP 
Tomatoes  0.0931  0.0132 0.4106 1.0812 0.3944 -0.6143 
Dry  Maize  0.4408  1.1407 1.0121 1.0792 0.9284 0.2934 
Irrigated  Maize 0.7018  0.2529 1.0121 1.0624 0.9950 -0.3357 
Sorghum  0.1351  0.4327 0.9088 1.2533 0.9018 0.2084 
Onion  0.2108  0.0283 0.4654 1.0528 0.4436 -0.5994 
Cabbage  0.0741  0.0155 0.6363 1.0634 0.6236 -0.3955 
Peanut  0.6311  0.1535 0.7473 1.0560 0.7183 -0.5315 
Beans  0.8956  0.2010 0.7303 1.0762 0.6275 -0.5654 
Green  Beans  0.1547  0.0186 0.3436 1.0793 0.3035 -0.6873 
Potatoes  0.1109  0.0114 0.3406 1.0850 0.3140 -0.6849 Chillies  0.2286  0.0380 0.4839 1.0661 0.4426 -0.5795 











For all production systems except dry land maize, the DRC that measures comparative advantage 
of alternative systems were less than 1 as can be seen also in table 4. However Potatoes had the 
highest comparative advantage (0.0114) followed by tomatoes (0.0132) and Cabbage (0.0155) as 
shown by the raking. Therefore it will profit the state more to produce these crops domestically. 
On the other hand, dry land maize, suffers from comparative disadvantage (1.1407), the system is 
costing the economy. Sorghum (0.4327), irrigated maize system (0.2529), beans with (0.2010), and 
















Table 4: Crops ranking by PCR and DRC 
Crops PCR  Rank  DRC  Rank 
Cabbage 0.0741  1  0.0155  3 
Tomatoes 0.0931  2  0.0132  2 
Potatoes 0.1109  3  0.0114  1 
Sorghum 0.1351  4  0.4327  11 
Green Beans  0.1547  5  0.0186  4 
Onion 0.2108  6  0.0283  5 
Chillies 0.2286  7  0.0380  7 
Sweet Potatoes  0.3064  8  0.0284  6 
Dry Maize  0.4408  9  1.1407  12 
Peanut 0.6311  10  0.1535  8 












5.  Conclusion 
PAM has been used in the study to analyse the competitiveness and comparative advantage of 
various crops under small-scale irrigation and dry land farming systems in Limpopo Province 
using the 2006/2007 production data.  
 
For the twelve crops production systems analysed, all the crops were found to be privately 
profitable; while dry land maize was found not to be socially profitable with other crops being 
socially profitable. Majority of the production systems where however, not protected in term of 
SPR, EPC and NPC. This indicated that most small scale productive systems are not being given 
any incentive to produce. 
 Despite positive profitability for all systems and positive  social profitability from most production 
systems, the research shows that vegetables especially Potatoes, tomatoes and cabbage have the 
highest profitability and comparative advantage over field crops like Dry land maize, peanut and 
beans production systems. It is there recommended that more efforts should be put in place to 
encourage small-scale irrigators to expand their production of these vegetables in the Limpopo 
Province to increase their competitiveness. 
 
As shown by the result, government intervention in the small-scale agricultural sector through 
price policy is not necessary. However, some public policy interventions may be necessary to 
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